The paper shows the ways of disclosing financial risks by IFRS 7 and certain types of sensitivity analysis. The different possibilities of preparing a sensitivity analysis, such as value at risk are illustrated and their suitability for reporting are faced critically. Following, the manner of...

The paper shows the ways of disclosing financial risks by IFRS 7 and certain types of sensitivity analysis. The different possibilities of preparing a sensitivity analysis, such as value at risk are illustrated and their suitability for reporting are faced critically. Following, the manner of...

This paper identifies the science of governance as a crucial blind spot for risk managers, company directors, regulators and law makers. There is little evidence that law-makers, corporate governance reformers or risk managers apply the science of governance identified 60 years ago. As a result,...

The well-documented banking company failures that occurred in the UK over 2007 and 2008 have enhanced the importance and scope of the risk management function performed by boards. It is consequently a universal expectation of non-executive directors (NEDs) today that they provide high-level...

Legal scholarship has been silent about a phenomenon with profound implications for governance: the automation of compliance with laws mandating risk management. Regulations - from bank capitalization rules, to Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions on financial fraud and misrepresentation, to laws...

With the Great Recession and the regulatory reform that followed, the search for reliable means to capture systemic risk and to detect macrofinancial problems has become a central concern. In the United States, this concern has been institutionalized through the Financial Stability Oversight...

With the Great Recession and the regulatory reform that followed, the search for reliable means to capture systemic risk and to detect macrofinancial problems has become a central concern. In the United States, this concern has been institutionalized through the Financial Stability Oversight...

We show that any objective risk measurement algorithm mandated by central banks for regulated financial entities will result in more risk being taken on by those financial entities than would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, the risks taken on by the regulated financial entities are far more...