We consider optimal incentive contracts when managers can, in addition to shirking or diverting funds, increase short term profits by putting the firm at risk of a low probability "disaster." To avoid such risk-taking, investors must cede additional rents to the manager. In a dynamic context,...

We provide a theoretical model linking firm characteristics and expected returns. The key ingredient of our model is technological shocks embodied in new capital (IST shocks), which affect the profitability of new investments. Firms' exposure to IST shocks is endogenously determined by the...

We study asset-pricing implications of innovation in a general-equilibrium overlapping- generations economy. Innovation increases the competitive pressure on existing firms and workers, reducing the profits of existing firms and eroding the human capital of older workers. Due to the lack of...

This paper examines the relationship between technological progress and the riskiness of labor income using employer-employee matched income data from the United States. Results suggest innovation is associated with a substantial increase in the labor income risk, especially for workers at the...

We examine the relation between technological progress and the riskiness of labor income. Motivated by a simple model of creative destruction, we draw a distinction between technological innovation advanced by the firm, or its competitors. Using administrative data from the United States, we...

We examine the relation between technological progress and the riskiness of labor income. Motivated by a simple model of creative destruction, we draw a distinction between technological innovation advanced by the firm, or its competitors. Using administrative data from the United States, we...