Over the past decade, commercial banks have devoted many resources to developing internal models to better quantify their financial risks and assign economic capital. These efforts have been recognized and encouraged by bank regulators; for example, the 1997 Market Risk Amendment (MRA) formally...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value--a firm's profit-generating potential--as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value -- a firm’s profit-generating potential -- as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the...

This paper was presented at the conference "Financial services at the crossroads: capital regulation in the twenty-first century" as part of session 3, "Issues in value-at-risk modeling and evaluation." The conference, held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on February 26-27, 1998, was...

Bank supervisory monitoring, both on-site and off-site, generates a wealth of information with which to judge the safety and soundness of banks and bank holding companies (BHCs). For BHCs with publicly traded securities, the monitoring efforts of investors generate additional information that...