Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...

This paper looks to see if departures from risk neutrality cause subjects to behave differently in randomly terminated supergames compared to infinitely discounted supergames. I show that if subjects have a strictly monotonic utility function, and that utility function is applied to their entire...

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication promotes cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer the question how much communication is needed to sustain...

In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a...

We present new descriptive evidence on the immigrant-native gap in risk and time preferences in Germany, one of the most preferred host countries for immigration. Using the recent waves of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) dataset, we find that the immigrant-native gap in risk preferences has...

Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria - the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike...

The paper reexamines the welfare economics of intergenerational risk. Risk and its resolution over time are modeled as a decision tree: in each period, the consumption of the current one-period living generation is to be traded-off against uncertain benefits of future generations; as time...

Climate policies have stochastic consequences that involve a great number of generations. This calls for evaluating social risk (what kind of societies will future people be born into) rather than individual risk (what will happen to people during their own lifetimes). As a response we propose...

The paper reexamines the ethics of intergenerational risk. When risk re-solves gradually, earlier decisions cannot depend on the realization of later shocks and, consequently, some inequalities across generations are inevitable. To account for these inequalities, risky intergenerational...

We consider a simple two-period model with irreversible investment with strategic interactions. In this setup, we try to extend the concept of the quasi-option value (QOV) by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), Fisher and Hanemann (1987) and Hanemann (1989) to a game-theoretic situation. In...