This paper complements the existing literature on auditor-client negotiations by providing insights on the auditors' and clients' preferences for distributive negotiation strategies in an economic setting where negotiations may fail even if a common negotiation range exists. The analysis reveals...

We develop a theory of negotiation in which deals have multiple dimensions that can be bundled together. We use theory and experiments to show that in such settings efficient trade is possible even with substantial asymmetric information. The benefits of identifying areas of mutual gain guide...

Consider a contract over trade in continuous time between two players, according to which one player makes a payment to the other in exchange for an exogenous service. At each point in time, either player may unilaterally require an adjustment to the contract payment, involving adjustment costs...

Final-offer arbitration (FOA) is a widely used binding dispute resolution mechanism, where an impartial arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the two final offers pro- posed by two disputing parties. We build an equilibrium model of FOA with agents averse to arbitral uncertainty to study...

Priority structures are uncertain in real-life college admissions markets. This study investigates how information structures on priority affect resulting allocations. To do this, we focus on a class of real-life information structures that are represented as cutoff signals, which privately tell...

In this note we point out the effect of risk-aversion on both the speed of deterministic convergence and the waiting times involved in equilibrium selection in 2 X 2 coordination games. Risk-aversion destabilizes the Pareto optimal equilibrium in two different ways: it decreases the size of its...

This paper shows the importance of technological synergies among heterogeneous firms for aggregate fluctuations. First, we document six novel empirical facts using microdata that suggest the existence of important technological synergies between trading firms, the presence of positive...

We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the "name" but not the "type" of the other...