This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty of the design allows me to study both coordination failures and coordination efficiency in a repeated-game, divided majority setting. I assess and compare the performance of three voting mechanisms,...

We propose a new paradigm to study coordination in complex social systems, such as financial markets, that accounts for fundamental uncertainty. This new context has features from prediction markets that have been shown previously to mitigate price bubbles in classical asset market experiments....

This article explores four questions. First, what theoretical frameworks help describe policy failure and success? Second, how might the decision that leads to failure or success be understood in terms of differing concepts of rationality and decisionmaking? Third, how does the discussion of...

We study how the optimal degree of conservatism relates to decision-making procedures in a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). In our framework, central bank conservatism is required to attenuate the volatility of monetary decisions generated by the presence of uncertainty about the committee...

Most of the conflict theory papers have used a one-shot game set-up. This does not correspond to reality and is certainly incapable of modeling real conflict situations. We propose a dynamic model with N-agents in an infinite time frame which allow us to adequately analyze conflicts. The dynamic...

We introduce uncertainty in our general equilibrium model with multi-member groups, following the classical state-space approach of Arrow-Debreu. A host of new interesting economic issues emerge. First, risk averse agents can attempt to insure themselves through markets or through mutual...

Climate change is likely to trigger abrupt and potentially persistent changes in the structure and function of marine ecosystems. Such ‘regime shifts' threaten the livelihoods of millions of people reliant on small-scale fisheries. Yet, it is largely unknown how resource users cope with regime...

Many important economic and political decisions are made by teams. In the economic literature, however, the decision units are frequently modeled as individual economic agents. The paper experimentally investigates the question to what extent observed team decisions under risk are actually...

Societies provide institutions that are costly to use, but able to enforce long-run relationships. We study the optimal decision problem of using self-governance for risk sharing or governance through enforcement provided by these institutions. Third-party enforcement is modelled as a costly...

When people share risk in financial markets, intermediaries provide costly enforcement for most trades and, hence, are an integral part of financial marketsu0092 organization. We assess the degree of risk sharing that can be achieved through financial markets when enforcement is based on the...