Showing 1 - 10 of 2,679
by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014380287
Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria - the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224794
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents who have private information on their ability. Two heterogenous firms - characterized by vertical, respectively horizontal,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253127
I develop a model of strategic entry by candidates for office in runoff elections under aggregate uncertainty. I introduce aggregate uncertainty by making candidates unsure of the distribution of voter preferences in the electorate. The set of three candidate equilibria expands and equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921841
We study the long-run behavior of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent seeking contest. In contrast with standard evolutionary game theory, we distinguish between utility and material payoffs, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014109935
This paper reports an experiment that examines whether groups can make better decisions than individuals in contests …. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to theoretical … players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make bids that are 25% lower, bids have less variance, and there …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528454
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818591
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511
A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333738
A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365868