How do banks choose their debt maturity structure when credit markets are subject to information frictions? This paper proposes a model of equilibrium maturity choice with asymmetric information and endogenous roll-over risk. We show that in the presence of public signals about firms'...

We propose a measure for systemic risk: CoVaR, the value at risk (VaR) of financial institutions conditional on other institutions being in distress. We define an institution’s (marginal) contribution to systemic risk as the difference between CoVaR and the financial system’s VaR. From our...

This paper proposes Entity-Netted Notionals (ENNs) as a metric of interest rate risk transfer in the interest rate swap (IRS) market. Unlike the ubiquitous metric of notional amount, ENNs normalize for risk and account for the netting of longs and shorts within counter party relationships. Using...

We study key vulnerabilities of the US Primary Dealers during the 2007-08 financial crisis. Dealers' exposure to risky assets drives the repo run; importantly, repos become sensitive to counterparty risk only at the height of the crisis. Further, the way in which dealers use repo funding exposes...

This paper evaluates the model risk of models used for forecasting systemic and market risk. Model risk, which is the potential for different models to provide inconsistent outcomes, is shown to be increasing with market uncertainty. During calm periods, the underlying risk forecast models...

Historical VaR, CVaR and ES (Expected Shortfall) to LIQUIDATION Software is a model characterized by its straightforwardness, allowing regulators measure risk using a standard database of primitive factors and portfolio positions only, leaving little error margin in comparing market risk for...

This paper presents a possible solution to financial crises by addressing the core of the problem of systemic risk. To get there, it first illustrates a number of crises related situations before the definition of systemic risk is detailed. It then explains challenges of systemic risk and...

I develop a framework of the build-up and outbreak of financial crises in an asymmetric information setting. In equilibrium, two distinct economic states arise endogenously: normal times – periods of modest investment, and booms – periods of expansionary investment. Normal times occur when...

An expected utility based cost-benefit analysis is in general fragile to its distributional assumptions. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the utility function of the expected utility model to avoid this. The conditions ensure that expected (marginal) utility remains finite also...

Interbank borrowing and lending may induce systemic risk into financial markets. A simple model of this is to assume that log-monetary reserves are coupled, and that banks can also borrow/lend from/to a central bank. When all banks optimize their cost of borrowing and lending, this leads to a...