In the traditional channel, a retailer stocks the product from a manufacturer and sells it to consumers. In contrast, the retailer in the drop-shipping channel relays the consumers’ requests to the manufacturer who stocks and delivers the product to consumers. Due to their different...

Consider a Bertrand model in which each firm may be inactive with a known probability, so the number of active firms is uncertain. This simple model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which industry profits are positive and decline with the number of firms, the same features which make the...

This article analyses the capacity-then-price game for a duopoly market. We add to the literature by explicitly taking product differentiation into account. We study the impact of capacity costs, demand uncertainty, and vertical and horizontal product differentiation on equilibrium capacities,...

This paper studies two-part tariffs with explicit consideration of cost uncertainty and risk aversion. It finds that firms charge a risk premium over expected marginal cost for each unit they sell. This pricing rule is socially optimal if and only if the modeled market is fully covered in...

We study insurers’ behavior under monopoly and Cournot duopoly when they canaffect the probability or magnitude of harm from accidents. The way consumers’risk aversion changes with wealth and the way risk affects the slope of the demandfunction determine whether Cournot duopolists increase...

Firms producing differentiated products have high margins and therefore low risk. As a result firms invest more into developing differentiated products when they perceive risk is high. Higher risk also implies higher product skewness towards more differentiated products and therefore higher...

We develop a general equilibrium model in which heterogeneous entrepreneurs produce output in the presence of financing constraints. We model granular uncertainty as the shocks that affect the uncertainty in future idiosyncratic productivity without changing the cross-sectional dispersion of...

Building on dynamic collusion theories, we predict that firms with less concentrated upstream or downstream industries have lower systematic risk because their supply chain partners tend to compete more aggressively during recessions, absorbing more of the adverse effect of aggregate shocks....

In a game-theoretic model where agents compete for claims to a consumption stream, we characterize how creative destruction affects risk, wealth, and prices. Overinvestment not only imposes excessive disruption risk on existing assets and higher technological uncertainty, it also increases the...

We analyze the quantitative asset-pricing implications of peers' strategic rivalry by embedding oligopolistic competition within an endowment economy. Rivalry intensity increases endogenously as the discount rate rises or expected growth declines, because peers care less about future...