In this paper, I examine the impact of ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty), alongside that of risk, on firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions. I confirm the well-known result that an increase in risk— uncertainty over outcomes—is associated with an increase in management guidance (earnings...

We examine the association between I/B/E/S's disclosure of non-GAAP earnings and investor uncertainty around earnings announcements. On one hand, investor uncertainty may decrease with I/B/E/S's non-GAAP disclosure because these disclosures make investors aware of alternative performance...

I conduct an experiment with senior executives (CEOs, CFOs, controllers) to examine how their risk disclosure quality, with respect to disclosure volume and specificity, is influenced by three factors: first, whether the disclosure behavior is framed internally by the firm as obtaining a gain or...

To address agents' moral hazard over effort, incentive contracts impose risk on the agents. As performance measures become noisier, the conventional agency analysis predicts that principals will reduce the incentive weights assigned to such measures. However, prior empirical results (Prendergast...

Aiming to provide a confidence interval of the point estimate of reported accounting performance measures, uncertainty analysis disclosure is usually considered to contain valuable information (IASB, 2010; CFO Forum, 2009), However, little empirical evidence has been documented. As the first to...