This paper studies economies with complete markets where there is positive default on consumer debt. In a simple tractable two-period model, households can default partially, at a finite punishment cost, and competitive intermediaries price loans of different sizes separately. This environment...

We analyze a rating agency's incentives to distort ratings in a model with a monopolistic profit maximizing rating agency, a continuum of heterogeneous firms, and a competitive market of risk-neutral investors. Firms sell bonds, the value of a firm's bond is known to the firm and observable by...

I develop a framework of the build-up and outbreak of financial crises in an asymmetric information setting. In equilibrium, two distinct economic states arise endogenously: normal times – periods of modest investment, and booms – periods of expansionary investment. Normal times occur when...

This paper empirically examines the behavioral precautionary saving hypothesis by Koszegi and Rabin (2009) stating that uncertainty about future income triggers saving because of loss aversion. We extend their theoretical analysis to also consider the internal margin, i.e., the strength, of loss...

This paper empirically examines the behavioral precautionary saving hypothesis that uncertainty about future income triggers an increase in saving because of loss aversion. Guided by the theoretical model of Koszegi and Rabin (2009), we first extend their theoretical analysis to also consider...

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...

It is becoming increasingly important for firms to know when to take steps to reduce buyers' uncertainty about their products and services. This article focuses on investments that firms can make to reduce buyers' uncertainty about taste-related product attributes. Using an analytical model, we...

What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...

Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by...