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It's payback time: new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma

Bigoni, Maria; Casari, Marco; Salvanti, Andrea; … - 2022

In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the "tit-for-tat" family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805575

Talk to Me : Communication Reduces Uncertainty in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions

Dvorak, Fabian - 2020

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication promotes cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer the question how much communication is needed to sustain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854170

Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty : Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions

Dvorak, Fabian - 2018

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others' actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012908872

Risk and Repeated Games : Is Random Termination a Reasonable Proxy For Discounting?

Candreva, Christopher - 2019

This paper looks to see if departures from risk neutrality cause subjects to behave differently in randomly terminated supergames compared to infinitely discounted supergames. I show that if subjects have a strictly monotonic utility function, and that utility function is applied to their entire...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901787

Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring

Yang, Geyu - 2018

I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series … uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct … ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909525

Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection

Ebert, Michael - 2020

We study the design of public information structures that maximize the probability of selecting a Pareto dominant equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat the designer as able to implement an equilibrium only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838305

Strategies under Strategic Uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2019

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895797

Using Strategic Uncertainty to Persuade Multiple Agents

Hoshino, Tetsuya - 2017

A principal wishes to persuade multiple agents to take a particular action profile. Each agent cares about both a payoff-relevant state and others' actions. The principal discloses information about the state to control the agents' behavior by using their strategic uncertainty. We show that she...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955142

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

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