We consider a decentralized supply chain in which a downstream manufacturer purchases components from an upstream supplier privileged with private information about supply disruption risk. The supplier's initial reliability, asymmetric to the manufacturer, is either low or high. We examine two...

We study a dynamic contracting problem in which size is relevant. The agent may take on excessive risk to enhance short-term gains, which exposes the principal to large, infrequent losses. To preserve incentive compatibility, the optimal contract uses size as an instrument; there is downsizing...

I consider a real business cycle model in which agents have private information about an idiosyncratic shock to their value of leisure. I consider the mechanism design problem for this economy and describe a computational method to solve it. This is an important contribution of the paper since...

Cooperation among firms is governed by contracts. An interesting phenomenon is that some contracts are comprehensive while some are limited. This study tries to explain different levels of incompleteness of contracts that firms choose to govern their cooperation with. We find that a limited...