"Short-termism'' of executives has recently attracted a lot of public attention. This paper develops a novel measure of CEO compensation duration and studies how it affects corporate risk taking. This measure is constructed using grant-level data of CEO compensation and reflects vesting...

"We develop a model of informal risk-sharing in social networks, where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements and obtain two results. (1) The degree of informal insurance is...

This paper considers the effect of contracting limitations in risk-sharing networks, arisingfor example from observability, verifiability, complexity or cultural constraints. Wederive necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto efficiency under these constraints ina general setting, and we...

We develop a model of informal risk-sharing in social networks, where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements and obtain two results. (1) The degree of informal insurance is...

We develop a model of informal risk-sharing in social networks, where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements and obtain two results. (1) The degree of informal insurance is...