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The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of their competitors' valuations, but only the mean of the distribution. We propose a novel...
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We apply the aggregation property of Identical Shape Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion (ISHARA) utility functions to … analyze the comparative statics properties of a bargaining model with uncertainty. We identify sufficient and necessary … conditions under which an increase in one's degree of risk aversion bene fits/hurts one's opponent …
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