This paper describes a parsimonious macro-finance model where contracts are the mechanism by which differentially risk averse bondholders and stockholders resolve a conflict of interest problem and confront the risks associated with future investment and financing decisions of a representative...

In this paper I develop a model of a debt and equity financed representative firm whose production/investment decisions and financing decisions characterize business cycles. The conflict of interest problem between the differentially risk averse debt and equity investors is resolved with an...

This paper describes a business cycle model where financial contracting with interrelated covenants is the mechanism by which bondholders and stockholders confront the risks associated with future production-investment decisions and financing decisions of the firm and in the process resolves a...

This paper describes an equilibrium macro finance model where contracts are the mechanism by which differentially risk averse bondholders and stockholders resolve a conflict of interest problem and confront the risks associated with future operating decisions and financing decisions of a...

In this paper I develop a model that focuses attention on the financial side of business cycles. Investors in this model separate into bondholders and stockholders based on differences in risk aversion that creates a conflict of interest problem for the future management of the representative...