This paper looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then...

This paper presents a result of a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with partial communication. We found that the trend of mean investments depended on whether a communication network was connected or not and on how fast all subjects could share information.

This paper studies public good provision in the laboratory using voluntary contribution mechanism, in a cross-cultural experiment conducted in the United States and Japan.

This paper presents a result of a voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with partial communication. We found that the trend of mean investments depended on whether a communication network was connected or not and on how fast all subjects could share information.

This paper studies public good provision in the laboratory using voluntary contribution mechanism, in a cross-cultural experiment conducted in the United States and Japan.

This paper looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then...