We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for...

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012, 2013), and we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT).

This paper demonstrates the class of atomless spaces that accurately models the space of players in a large game which represents an idealized limit of a sequence of finite-player games. Through two examples, we show that arbitrary atomless probability spaces, in particular, the Lebesgue unit...

This paper reports a definitive resolution to the question of the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian–Nash equilibrium in games with a finite number of players, each with a compact metric action set and private information. The resolution hinges on saturated spaces. If the individual spaces...