This paper studies identification and estimation of first-price auctions if the bidders face ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Ambiguity is modeled using Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) Maxmin Expected Utility preferences. We exploit variation in the number of bidders to identify...

We estimate demand for personal computer processors using structural estimation of valuations and data from Internet multi-object discriminatory auctions. Three models of bidding and a suitable econometric procedure are used to compute the parameters that govern the distribution of the buyers'...

This online appendix contains the plots and supplemental descriptions for "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses."The paper "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses" to which this Supplement...

In this paper we propose a two-step semiparametric procedure to estimate first-price auction models. In the first-step, we estimate the bid density and distribution using local polynomial method, and recover a sample of (pseudo) private values. In the second-step, we apply the method of moments...

This chapter discusses structural econometric approaches to auctions. Remarkably, much of what can be learned from auction data can be learned without restrictions beyond those derived from the relevant economic model. This enables us to take a nonparametric perspective in discussing how the...

The paper presents conditions for non-parametric identification of a joint distribution when the marginal distributions are identified and the joint distribution is only identified for a subset of the domain. This result is applied to sealed bid auctions where bidders face competing auctions for...

This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of...

Governmental agencies use score procurement auctions to incorporate other attributes beyond price in their purchase decisions. We establish nonparametric econometric identification of bidders' independent private (pseudo)types for multi-attribute procurement, where bids are evaluated using a...

In this paper, we estimate the inefficiency in online auctions. Online auctions can be inefficient due to the Internet fraud. A typical example of Internet fraud is when sellers do not send goods to winning bidders even though they have received payment. Therefore, bidders always bear a risk of...

In laboratory experiments bidding in first-price auctions is more aggressive than predicted by the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (RNBNE) - a finding known as the overbidding puzzle. Several models have been proposed to explain the overbidding puzzle, but no canonical alternative to...