In this paper we study inference for a conditional model with a jump in the conditional density, where the location and size of the jump are described by regression lines. This interesting structure is shared by several structural econometric models. Two prominent examples are the standard...

In this paper we study estimation and inference in structural models with a jump in the conditional density, where the location and size of the jump are described by regression lines. Two prominent examples are auction models, where the density jumps from zero to a positive value, and the...

In this paper, we estimate the inefficiency in online auctions. Online auctions can be inefficient due to the Internet fraud. A typical example of Internet fraud is when sellers do not send goods to winning bidders even though they have received payment. Therefore, bidders always bear a risk of...

In this paper we propose a two-step semiparametric procedure to estimate first-price auction models. In the first-step, we estimate the bid density and distribution using local polynomial method, and recover a sample of (pseudo) private values. In the second-step, we apply the method of moments...

Using data from "WebsiteX", one of the largest online marketplaces in the world, we estimate a structural model of sponsored search auctions where bidders have heterogeneous click-through curves. Unlike earlier studies, our model accommodates two stylized empirical facts: the advertiser...

This online appendix contains the plots and supplemental descriptions for "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses."The paper "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses" to which this Supplement...

In laboratory experiments bidding in first-price auctions is more aggressive than predicted by the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (RNBNE) - a finding known as the overbidding puzzle. Several models have been proposed to explain the overbidding puzzle, but no canonical alternative to...

For symmetric auctions, there is a close relationship between distributions of order statistics of bidders’ valuations and observable bids that is often used to estimate or bound the valuation distribution, optimal reserve price, and other quantities of interest nonparametrically. However, we...

This chapter discusses structural econometric approaches to auctions. Remarkably, much of what can be learned from auction data can be learned without restrictions beyond those derived from the relevant economic model. This enables us to take a nonparametric perspective in discussing how the...

I propose an estimator for the seller's expected revenue function in a first-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and symmetric bidders, who can exhibit constant relative risk aversion and bid according to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. I build the proposed estimator from...