The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage. Since many factors reduce these incentives, including charter value, regulation, and managerial incentives, the net economic effect of these incentives is an empirical...

This paper constructs a Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI) to gauge the mismatch between the market liquidity of assets and the funding liquidity of liabilities, for 2882 bank holding companies over 2002 to 2014. The aggregate LMI decreases from $4 trillion pre-crisis to -$6 trillion in 2008. We...

This paper implements a liquidity measure, "Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI)," to gauge the mismatch between the market liquidity of assets and the funding liquidity of liabilities. We construct the LMIs for 2882 bank holding companies during 2002-2014 and investigate the time-series and...