In the presence of derivative markets, shareholders can choose their desired mix of cash-flows/votes and vary it through time. We find that the optimal security-voting structure is time varying. Even in the presence of derivatives, most of the time, shareholders optimally choose 1S1V. 1S1V turns...

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks’ unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

This study examines structural shifts in the market for bank control resulting from the court decision of Northeast Bancorp, Inc., et al. v. Board of Governors (1985), and analyze its impact on stock prices and risk incentives in affected banks. The outcome of the case reaffirmed the...

We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks' unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt holders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived...

We present a novel methodology to calculate the jump-induced tail risk premium for individual stocks and examine its effect on the following-month’s returns. The existence of a premium for bearing negative jump-induced tail risk is significantly associated with negative one-month future...