We advance the feedback/cash as ammunition hypothesis, namely that firms hold cash to address feedback from stock prices to cash ows and growth opportunities. Firms with more liquid stocks are expected to hold more cash, the opposite of the prediction from a standard information asymmetry...

Recent empirical evidence suggests that US industrial firms invest heavily in noncash, risky financial assets. Using hand-collected data on financial portfolios of German firms, we show that risky asset holdings are not an anomaly unique to the US. We find that industrial firms in Germany invest...

We investigate the effect of firm reliance on temporary workers on cash holdings. We exploit the quasi-natural experiment created by a temporary worker protection law in South Korea which requires firms to change a worker's status to full-time once the worker has been employed at the firm for...

This paper contributes to studies on corporate liquidity management. It explores the determinants of cash holdings of firms in emerging countries using panel data models. The results indicate that highly liquid firms in emerging countries show one or more of the following characteristics. They...

We examine the link between CEO overconfidence and speed of adjustment (SOA) of cash holdings for listed US firms. We find a negative effect of overconfident CEOs on the SOA. Further, CEO overconfidence increases the asymmetry in the SOA between firms with excess cash and those with a cash...

Using a large sample of 2,712 unique U.S. domestic takeovers over the period 1993 to 2014, we show a negative relation between the level of cash holdings and post-announcement corporate bond returns. Our findings support the agency cost of cash holdings view and show that bondholders and...

We investigate the effects of blockholder exit threats, which increase with stock liquidity, on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to shareholders. Exploiting decimalization as an exogenous shock to stock liquidity to identify the effects of blockholder exit threats, we find robust...

We examine whether passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 did in fact have the intended effect of reducing agency conflicts or did it alter managerial incentives in ways that could be detrimental to firm value. Our findings for the full sample suggest a decrease in firm value and the...

We develop a dynamic model of a firm in which cash management is partially delegated to a self-interested manager. Shareholders trade off the cost of dismissing the manager with the cost of managerial discretion over the use of liquid funds. An improvement in corporate governance quality may...