detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied. I discuss a dynamic model of cartel … formation and dissolution to illustrate how changes in antitrust policies and economic conditions might affect cartel duration … heterogeneity of cartels and the time-varying policy impacts suggested by theory. Contrary to earlier studies, my statistical tests …

detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied. I discuss a dynamic model of cartel … formation and dissolution to illustrate how changes in antitrust policies and economic conditions might affect cartel duration … heterogeneity of cartels and the time-varying policy impacts suggested by theory. Contrary to earlier studies, my statistical tests …

Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early … nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be eff ective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but …. Empirical evidence shows that the positive e ffect on cartel deterrence seems to dominate, but cannot provide definite evidence …

Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early … nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be effective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but …. Empirical evidence shows that the positive effect on cartel deterrence seems to dominate, but cannot provide definite evidence …

Based on an analysis of cartel prosecutions since 2007, this article assesses the way the European Commission has built …

price level: the price level that would have been observed in the absence of the cartel. This article discusses the …

Although the 1996 quot;Notice on the Non-imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Casesquot; has been criticised by … empirical assessment of horizontal cartel cases in the EC opened as a result of leniency applications under the 1996 notice … to each other by virtue of the same firms' involvement in more than one cartel, and all failed or ceased to operate …

We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartel-induced price increase. We …-in-differences' approach – and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel … period on the overcharge estimate. We find that the cement cartel led to price overcharges in a range from 20.3 to 26 …

breakdown of a German cement cartel. We find that, first, after the breakdown of the cartel, cartel members reduce net prices to … a far larger extent than gross prices and that, second, noncartel members slip under the price umbrella of the cartel to …