In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …

In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of … whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that, for any society, there exist matching environments where the … probability of the marital dissolution does not reduce divorce costs under gender-optimal matching rules. In such environments, an …

requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts … properties. We expect the use of our mechanisms to improve the performance of matching markets with distributional constraints in …

abilities (e.g., their exam scores). The matching outcome thus may be imperfect in terms of ex-ante fairness, which suggests … matching students with higher ability to better colleges. To achieve ex-ante fairness, we consider constraining student choice … unfair matching is also increased, resulting in a riskier matching outcome. Learning the game or providing students with …