We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that siblings will attend the same school. This last...

We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality...

We provide a real-life application of a large scale affirmative action policy in school choice in the context of engineering school admissions in India where students not only care about what program they are matched to but also what type of seat category they are admitted under. We explain the...

Divided enrollment systems cause school assignments to be unfair and wasteful. Iterative version of the student-optimal stable mechanism (I-SOSM), proposed by Manjunath and Turhan (2016), achieves individually rational and fair assignments in such partitioned school choice markets for any number...

We consider a stable improvement problem in a controlled school choice model which covers those of several previous studies. First, we consider the case where the priority for each school is a weak order. We derive a sufficient condition for a stable matching to be constrained efficient. It is...

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic...

I investigate three goals of school choice: student welfare, encouraging neighborhood schools, and diversity. I develop a framework for finding the optimal match for any combination of these objectives while respecting stability and incentive compatibility. I then apply my framework to data from...

The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools for 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this divided enrollment system and show that an...

In the school choice market, where scarce public school seats are assigned to students, a key operational issue is how to reassign seats that are vacated after an initial round of centralized assignment. Practical solutions to the reassignment problem must be simple to implement, truthful and...

We study self-selection in centralized school choice, a strategy that takes place when students submit preferences before knowing their priorities at schools. A student self-selects if she decides not to apply to some schools despite being desirable. We give a theoretical explanation for this...