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Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267
-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986
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The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur - 2014
A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles procedure to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of Gale's original...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429798
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Transparency and fairness in school choice mechanisms
Hermstrüwer, Yoan - 2019
assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041733
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Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
Fragiadakis, Daniel; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 863-908
requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts … properties. We expect the use of our mechanisms to improve the performance of matching markets with distributional constraints in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705212
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Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure
Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2016
Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to asses the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544967
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Cognitive ability and games of school choice
Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2016
We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used manipulable Boston-mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this is the case: lower ability participants receive lower...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544973
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Protecting unsophisticated applicants in school choice through information disclosure
Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2016
Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to assess the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011477310
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Aiding applicants : leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2021
In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191426
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Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco - 2021
In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697476
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School choice and loss aversion
Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021
Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801