A mechanism to restructure the debt of an insolvent euro country is a missing element in the emerging institutional architecture of the euro area. The introduction of an insolvency procedure for sovereigns faces a dilemma: In the foreseeable future, its introduction would risk pushing Europe...

This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of the two Belize sovereign debt restructurings in 2006–07 and in 2012–13 that occurred outside of an IMF-supported program. It finds that the motivation for the two debt restructurings differed, as the former was driven by external...

This paper examines the causes, process, and outcome of Belize’s 2016–17 sovereign debt restructuring – its third episode in last 10 years. As was the case in the earlier two restructurings, in 2006-07 and in 2012-13, the 2016-17 debt restructuring was executed through collaborative...

This paper surveys the literature on sovereign debt from the perspective of understanding how sovereign debt differs from privately issue debt, and why sovereign debt is deemed safe in some countries but risky in others. The answers relate to the unique power of the sovereign. One the one hand,...

This paper provides an overview of the ongoing debate on the international Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) architecture by highlighting two key aspects, the contractual and the statutory approach, while also alluding to alternatives that have been set forth, such as arbitration,...

How costly are sovereign debt crises? In this paper we study output losses during sovereign default and debt renegotiation episodes since 1980. In contrast to previous work, we account for the severity of default and not only for its occurrence. Specifically, we distinguish between "hard" and...

Sovereign debt crises are difficult to solve. This paper studies the "holdout problem", meaning the risk that creditors refuse to participate in a debt restructuring. We document a large variation in holdout rates, based on a comprehensive new dataset of 23 bond restructurings with external...

Sovereign debt crises are difficult to solve. This paper studies the "holdout problem", meaning the risk that creditors refuse to participate in a debt restructuring. We document a large variation in holdout rates, based on a comprehensive new dataset of 23 bond restructurings with external...

This paper discusses the legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring in the Euro area – both de lege lata and de lege ferenda. Sovereign debt restructurings remain exceptional events that come with profound implications for financial stability and monetary policy transmission. However,...

Two complainants brought a constitutional complaint before the German Constitutional Court. The complaint was directed against a judgement of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) that dismissed their action because the Hellenic Republic enjoyed state immunity before the German...