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School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil-teacher ratios : experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools
Duflo, Esther; Dupas, Pascaline; Kremer, Michael - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009570286
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School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil-teacher ratios : experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools
Duflo, Esther; Dupas, Pascaline; Kremer, Michael - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009530254
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School Governance, Teacher Incentives, and Pupil-Teacher Ratios : Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Primary Schools
Duflo, Esther - 2012
-hired civil-service teachers in schools randomly assigned PTA contract teachers endogenously reduced their effort. Civil … existing teachers. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs reduced both forms of capture. The best contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108303
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School governance, teacher incentives, and pupil-teacher ratios : experimental evidence from Kenyan primary schools
Duflo, Esther; Dupas, Pascaline; Kremer, Michael - 2012
We examine a program that enabled Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Kenya to hire novice teachers on short …-term contracts, reducing class sizes in grade one from 82 to 44 on average. PTA teachers earned approximately one-quarter as much as … teachers operating under central government civil-service institutions but were absent one day per week less and their students …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009540758
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School Governance, Teacher Incentives, and Pupil-Teacher Ratios : Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Primary Schools
Duflo, Esther - 2012
-hired civil-service teachers in schools randomly assigned PTA contract teachers endogenously reduced their effort. Civil … existing teachers. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs reduced both forms of capture. The best contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460720
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Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking : Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
Duflo, Esther - 2010
To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to present material at a more appropriate level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012758162
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Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking : Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
Duflo, Esther - 2008
To the extent that students benefit from high-achieving peers, tracking will help strong students and hurt weak ones. However, all students may benefit if tracking allows teachers to present material at a more appropriate level. Lower-achieving pupils are particularly likely to benefit from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464172
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Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking : Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
Duflo, Esther; Dupas, Pascaline; Kremer, Michael - 2011
primary schools in Kenya. While the direct effect of high-achieving peers is positive, tracking benefited lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178359
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The political economy of education in Kenya
Kremer, Michael - In: Institutions and norms in economic development, (pp. 85-108). 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003504280
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Education policy analysis
Centre for Educational Research and Innovation; OECD - 1997-2006: Paris : OECD - 1997 - 1999; 2001 - 2005/06(2006); damit Ersch. eingest.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000646278