We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible … of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matching market in …-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one market? First, we provide sufficient …

We study a matching model with heterogeneous agents, nontransferable utility and search frictions. Agents differ along … specifications can be treated as a case of horizontal heterogeneity only. -- Matching ; Horizontal Differentiation ; Marriage Markets …

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often … room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense … and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching …

We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of …, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching …