This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power...

We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We study steadystate equilibria and characterize the limit of the corresponding equilibrium matchings as exogenous search frictions become small. The central question is whether the...

This note contains a result concerning the total sampling cost in optimal simultaneous search when the distribution from which the sample is taken depends on the cost of search and when the marginal sampling cost is small

We develop a dynamic matching and bargaining game with aggregate uncertainty about the relative scarcity of a commodity. We use our model to study price discovery in a decentralized exchange economy: Traders gradually learn about the state of the market through a sequence of multilateral...