We propose a random network model incorporating heterogeneity of agents and a continuous notion of homophily. Unlike the vast majority of the corresponding economic literature, we capture homophily in terms of similarity rather than equality of agents. We show that if links between similar...

We propose a random network model incorporating heterogeneity of agents and a continuous notion of homophily. Unlike the vast majority of the corresponding economic literature, we capture homophily in terms of similarity rather than equality by assuming that the probability of linkage between...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a bipartite network. Coordination frictions arise if workers and firms only observe their own links. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. Only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post competition...

This paper adds a quasi-network to a search model of the labor market. Fitting the model to an average unemployment rate and to other moments in the data implies the presence of the network is not noticeable in the basic properties of the unemployment and job finding rates. However, the network...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the...

We introduce an irregular network structure into a model of frictional, on-the-job search in which workers find jobs through their network connections or directly from firms. We show that jobs found through network search have wages that stochastically dominate those found through direct...