characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of … the resulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in … ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the best workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is …

characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of … the resulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in … ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the best workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is …

This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the … policy proposals, low-quality candidates face incentives to mimic their high-quality counterparts and a selection problem … arises. We nd that powerconcentrating institutions amplify this selection problem as they increase electoral stakes and thus …

differs from several other elected offices in the U.S., which impose term limits on incumbents. Term limits may harm the … negative or small and that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats. Because of this, term …

This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the … policy proposals, low-quality candidates face incentives to mimic their high-quality counterparts and a selection problem … arises. We find that power-concentrating institutions amplify this selection problem as they increase electoral stakes and …

This paper studies the effects of power-concentrating institutions on the quality of political selection, i.e., the …