of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation, the escalation of liability … the state. Our paper presents a strategic model of litigation under a negligence rule. We extend Spier's (1997 …) theoretical framework on litigation by explicitly modeling frivolous lawsuits. In this way, we capture the main welfare effects of …

promotes unnecessary litigation (Dodson, 2000), the escalation of liability insurance premiums and over-deterrence. In an … strategic model of liability and litigation that incorporates agency problems between the plaintiff and its attorney and court … deterrence and litigation outcomes and find a predictability threshold beyond which the deterrence effect of punitive awards …

that reforms that reduce the firm's expected litigation loss also affect the firm's expenditures on accident prevention … on liability and litigation and extends it in a number of ways. First, we incorporate the split-award statute into the … framework. Second, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique litigation stage equilibrium that survives the universal …

, plaintiffs are more willing to accept lower settlement offers and therefore, the firm's expected litigation loss is lowered under … this statute. It is important to note, however, that the reduction in the firm's expected litigation loss will affect its … a strategic model of litigation under asymmetric information to investigate the effect of the split-award reform on the …

While it is typically taken for granted that settlement of lawsuits increases social welfare, this paper shows that … settlement can lower welfare. If the defendant has private information about the harm from his action both at the time of the … action and the time of settlement bargaining, then defendants who cause different levels of harm can pay the same settlement …