Showing 1 - 10 of 447
models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in cooperative games, compare different network structures with each other … illustrate these network structures by applying them to cooperative games with restricted cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012605985
The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear … fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from markets with … concave utility functions generate totally balanced games where the players in the game are the participants in the economy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009328147
The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear … fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from markets with … concave utility functions generate totally balanced games where the players in the game are the participants in the economy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008624634
models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in cooperative games, compare different network structures with each other … illustrate these network structures by applying them to cooperative games with restricted cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434059
be obtained by applying the Shapley value to associated coalitional transferable utility games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013356492
Cooperative games with a permission structure are useful tools for analyzing the impact of hierarchical structures on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013356493
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472330
We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472331
instability. We introduce two budget allocation rules, both borrowed from the cooperative games literature: the balanced …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496062
through cooperative games with rules defined directly from the problem, either through algorithms for computing a minimal tree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496126