We consider the problem of specifying Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory agreements faced by standard-setting organizations. Along with Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2007), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents to be weak in the...

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to...

A group of firms consider collaborating on a project which requires a combination of elements which are owned by some of them. These elements are nonrival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion like for instance knowledge, data or informations, patents or copyrights. We address...

A group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non-rival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms...

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...