In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative model. There is an agent (the innovator), having relevant information which can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information share a market. The expected utility of each of them can be improved...

The aim of this paper is to analyze the interconnections between employment and unionization. We will also see how unemployment benefits drive the interplay of employment and unionization. The basic input into our model stems from cooperative game theory. Building on the Shapley value, several...

A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are...

This paper defines a measure of bargaining uncertainty that quantifies Roth's concept of strategic risk. It shows how this measure can be used for checking reliability of the Shapley value in cost allocation problems and in the theory of competitive equilibrium. Salient properties of the new...

The paper presents a coalition-structure value that is meant to capture outside options of players in a cooperative game. It deviates from the Aumann-Drèze value by violating the null-player axiom. We use this value as a power index and apply it to weighted majority games.

In an article by Hamiache (IJGT, 2001) an axiomatization of the Shapley value has been proposed. Three axioms were called on, inessential game, continuity and associated consistency. This present article proposes a new proof, based on elementary linear algebra. Games are represented by vectors....

We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not...

This paper studies a procedural and axiomatic extension of the consensus value [cf. Ju et al. (2007)] to the class of partition function form games. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By...

The paper presents a framework in which the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. None of the main results is original.