Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing decisions by altering the cast 'yes' or 'no' votes. Recently this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as 'yes' or 'no' votes can change decisions. This theory is often applied to...

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benefit too. The problem is to divide the profit of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of...

In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems on a rooted tree, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, we call these games irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the...

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that...

In finance risk capital allocation raises important questions both from theoretical and practical points of view. How to share risk of a portfolio among its subportfolios? How to reserve capital in order to hedge existing risk and how to assign this to different business units? We use an...