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The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) games, TU games with limited cooperation introduced by an arbitrary digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players, is introduced. It is defined as the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations that do...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011144450
Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitional structure in which only certain sets of players, including the set of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes into account the marginal contribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092822
In this paper we introduce the concept of quasi-building set that may underlie the coalitional structure of a cooperative game with restricted communication between the players. Each feasible coalition, including the set of all players, contains a nonempty subset called the choice set of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092854
Herings et al. (2008) proposed a solution concept called the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. We provide a characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. The characteration underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of agents,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092914
Abstract: In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090663
In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326524
In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586685
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