This paper introduces a new class of interactive cooperative purchasing situations and provides an explicit alternative characterization of the nucleolus of cooperative games, which offers an alternative to Kohlberg (1971). In our cooperative purchasing situation, the unit price of a commodity...

In this paper we consider spanning tree problems, where n players want to be connected to a source as cheap as possible. We introduce and analyze (n!) vertex oriented construct and charge procedures for such spanning tree situations leading in n steps to a minimum cost spanning tree and a cost...

In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players. preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning...

The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) is one of the most prominent one-point solution concepts in cooperative game theory that divides revenues (or cost, power) that can be obtained by cooperation of players in the game. The Shapley value is mathematically characterized by properties that have...

The research that studies the interaction between sequencing situations and cooperative games, that started with the paper of Curiel et al. (1989), has become an established line of research. This paper introduces a new model in this field: partitioning sequencing situations and games. The...