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Right on Schedule : CEO Option Grants and Opportunism
Daines, Robert - 2016
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
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CEO turnover, firm performance and enterprise reform in China : evidence from new micro data
Kato, Takao (contributor); Long, Cheryl (contributor) - 2006
Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics, we estimate Logit models of CEO turnover. We find consistently for all performance measures including both stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003253453
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Ironing Out the Kinks in Executive Compensation : Linking Incentive Pay to Average Stock Prices
Tian, Yisong S. - 2012
Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100690
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Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation
Agrawal, Anup - 2019
We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906210
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The Retention Effects of Unvested Equity : Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting
Jochem, Torsten - 2018
We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show this by analyzing a unique regulatory change (FAS 123-R) that prompted 723 firms to suddenly eliminate stock option vesting periods. This allowed CEOs to keep 33% more options when departing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937264
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Managers’ Stock-Based Compensation and Disclosures of High Proprietary Cost Information : An Investigation of US Biotech Firms
Enache, Luminita - 2020
proprietary information. While prior studies suggest that stock-based compensation provides managers with an incentive to enhance … that, on average, managers' stock-based compensation is not significantly related with their disclosure of high proprietary … cost information. More importantly, we find that a larger amount of stock-based compensation motivates managers to reveal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853081
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Executive Stock-Based Compensation : A Case Study in Valuing Employee Stock Options and Restricted Stock Issues in a Breach of Contract Case
Steward, Dwight - 2010
In this case study, the former CEO of a large telecommunication company filed a lawsuit against her former employer that alleged that the company's contract breach resulted in the loss ESO grants and diminished the value of the vested ESOs that she held at the time of the alleged contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147170
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The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings
Choi, Bobae - 2016
earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their private information with shareholders, it will … expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012995653
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Managerial Risk Preference and Firm Performance Volatility : New Evidence from Executive Deferred Compensation
Cen, Wei - 2012
Using novel data from executive deferred compensation, this paper presents new evidence on the relationship between CEO risk preference and firm risk (the volatility of firm performance measures such as stock return, earnings and operating cash flows). My results show a negative association...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170281
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Ironing Out the Wrinkles in Executive Compensation : Linking Incentive Pay to Average Stock Prices
Tian, Yisong S. - 2012
Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110514