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Material-Adverse-Change clauses (MACs) are present in virtually every acquisition agreement. These clauses are the outcome of extensive negotiation and exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation in the number and types of events that are excluded from being ‘material adverse events' (MAEs)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116114
This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, then investors rely less on costly unbiased research....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826268
This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012306701
We study the role of trading, and in particular market making, for the provision of stock-based incentives to managers. Market making provides liquidity as it allows trading on private information about the value of the firm. But in a liquid market the stock price does not react much to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012862306
This paper asked the question of whether the behavior and compensation of interlocked executives and non-independent board of directors are consistent with the hypothesis of governance problem or whether this problem is mitigated by implicit and market incentives. It then analyzes the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903789
II address the way agency incentives evolve, from listed equity with low liquidity to highly liquid stocks with active informed speculators. I conclude that, as the informativeness of stock price about the manager's actions improves, less weight needs to be given to both equity and non-price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012889282
We propose a new theory of suboptimal risk-taking based on contractual externalities. We examine an industry with a continuum of firms. Each firm's manager exerts costly hidden effort. The productivity of effort is subject to systematic shocks. Firms' stock prices reflect their performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009577025
We study an optimal contracting problem between shareholders and managers when managers' effort choices are hidden but on which stock market prices reveal some information. When the stock market rewards winners and punishes losers within an industry, stock-based incentive generates a tournament...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109129
This paper shows that there is a natural trade-off when designing market-based executive compensation. The benefit of market-based pay is that the stock price aggregates speculators' dispersed information and therefore takes a picture of managerial performance before the long-term value of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012777574
We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904735