When there is uncertainty about a CEO's quality, news about the firm causes rational investors to update their expectation of the firm's value for two reasons: Updates occur because of the direct effect of the news, and also because news leads investors to update their assessment of the CEO's...

This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, then investors rely less on costly unbiased research....

Since its lethality increases exponentially with age, the early 2020 COVID-19 shock unexpectedly raised the risk of corporate disruption at companies led by older CEOs. While normally unprepared successions might be beneficial by replacing entrenched CEOs, this systemic shock projected a...

This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a...

Research into group decision-making suggests that any optimal managerial compensation incentive design should incorporate synergistic interrelationships among top executives within a firm. This paper investigates whether the equity incentive structure of a management team affects firm-level...

This paper examines the implications of CEO overconfidence for firm distress risk and investment-related activities in the unique context of adverse incidents. I use an options‐based proxy for CEO overconfidence and study two types of adverse incidents: negative news reports and hurricanes....

The growing global emphasis on diversity, equity, and inclusion has also put the spotlight on the role of gender in the corporate world. Women have increasingly found a place in senior leadership and boards owing to regulatory and societal changes. Extant literature has also discussed the...

This paper asked the question of whether the behavior and compensation of interlocked executives and non-independent board of directors are consistent with the hypothesis of governance problem or whether this problem is mitigated by implicit and market incentives. It then analyzes the role of...

Suppose the value of a firm is endogenously determined by a manager's costly effort. We call this manager a distinguished player if he also can trade shares of the firm on a market. Arbitrage-free asset pricing theory suggests that the equilibrium market price reflects the value increasing...

Many commentators have suggested that companies pay top executives with deferred compensation, a type of incentive known as inside debt. Recent SEC disclosure reforms greatly increased the transparency of deferred compensation. We investigate stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies’...