On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...

I examine how negative ESG news distorts shareholder outcomes. In 2015 As You Sow began the yearly release of "The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs" list, leading to negative ESG news for firms that make the list. Overpaying CEOs is a governance concern as it signals a failure in proper controls and a...

This study investigates market reactions to announcements of CEO turnover and finds that forced turnovers are not accompanied by positive returns, which contradicts the broad view that firing a CEO sends a positive signal to the market. This contradiction is further explored by focusing on the...

To gain insights about the quality of boards' firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand-collected sample of 208 "clean'' turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous...