This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

Whereas the agency theory predicts that dual-class shares decrease firm performance, the stewardship theory predicts that dual-class shares increase firm performance. The cumulative findings on the performance consequences of dual-class shares have been weak and/or inconclusive. Because...

This article examines the relationship between aggregate earnings and returns (ERC) in a global context. We examine a broad international sample of countries which encompass markets with different levels of stock market development, shareholder protection and legal origin. Recent literature...

We examine the effect of insider share pledges on corporate fraud. We find a positive, causal relation between share pledges by controlling shareholders and detected corporate fraud. Firms whose controlling shareholders pledge have longer fraud detection cycles and receive lighter punishments....

Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and...

Prior research finds that when investors receive credible bad news about a firm, they revise their valuations of that firm downward. We examine a setting where investors receive bad news about a firm and revise their valuations of that firm upward. Specifically, we find that when activist...

It is well understood that the equity of an insolvent firm can trade for a positive price so long as there is some positive probability that the firm will become solvent at some future point. Currently, however, this insight exists in the case law in an informal sense, while its use in the...