Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent(s) may use the current price to signal its strength to deter entry. We show that, due to the importance of entrants' types on the post-entry duopoly/oligopoly profits, the incumbent(s) may want...

We present an infinite horizon model that studies the competition between a relatively ineffective incumbent Credit Rating Agency (CRA) and a sequence of entrant CRAs that are potentially more effective but whose ability in appraising default risk is unproven at the time they enter the market....

This paper examines whether there is a natural barrier to entry in the credit rating industry. We consider an in nite horizon model in which each period, an original incumbent faces competition from an entrant randomly selected from a pool of ex ante identical potential entrants. The incumbent's...

Our simple model features agents heterogeneous in skill and risk aversion, incomplete financial markets, and redistributive taxation. In equilibrium, agents become entrepreneurs if their skill is sufficiently high or risk aversion sufficiently low. Under heavier taxation, entrepreneurs are more...

Supply chain interactions are a critical aspect of any firm's competitive strategy, and involve both input price negotiations and complementary investment decisions. This paper provides a model of strategic investment that predicts how customers match with suppliers, and how the way in which...