Models based on asymmetric information predict that debt is least sensitive to private information and cannot explain the illiquidity of corporate debt in secondary markets. We analyze security design with moral hazard and offer a new explanation. First, the optimal compensation contract creates...

We consider loans being marked to market to constitute new information that is only immediately available to large institutional traders, so-called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Smaller investors (non-QIBs) do not have instant access to such information. Investigating the effects of...

This paper studies the role of optimal managerial compensation in reducing uncertainty about manager reporting objectives. It is shown that, paradoxically, firm owners allow managers with higher propensity to manipulate the short-term stock price to push for higher-powered and more short-term...

This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, then investors rely less on costly unbiased research....

This paper studies the role of optimal managerial compensation in reducing uncertainty about manager reporting objectives. It is shown that, paradoxically, firm owners allow managers with higher propensity to manipulate the short‐term stock price to push for higher powered and more...

This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a...

This paper attempts to investigate the impact of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash risk. Using a sample of 1,402 listed-banks in 55 countries for the period 2005-2013, we show that credit information sharing through public credit registries is negatively associated...