The present crisis is the bottom of a recurring problem that I call the leverage cycle, in which leverage gradually rises too high then suddenly falls much too low. The government must manage the leverage cycle in normal times by monitoring and regulating leverage to keep it from getting too...

We show that firms in industries in which firm-specific stock price variation is larger use more external financing and allocate capital with greater precision in the sense that their marginal q ratios are closer to one. According to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, greater firm-specific stock...

Models based on asymmetric information predict that debt is least sensitive to private information and cannot explain the illiquidity of corporate debt in secondary markets. We analyze security design with moral hazard and offer a new explanation. First, the optimal compensation contract creates...

Based on a dataset including 11,636 private debt placements issued globally between 1999 and 2016, we investigate the association between borrower-lender information asymmetry and the cost of debt for issuers. We observe that information asymmetry due to being a private or unrated firm is...

We test whether agency conflicts generated by the divergence between insider voting rights and cash flow rights (i.e., disproportionate insider control) within dual-class firms reduce the informativeness of stock returns about future earnings. We find that the future earnings response...

This paper attempts to investigate the impact of credit information sharing on bank-specific stock price crash risk. Using a sample of 1,402 listed-banks in 55 countries for the period 2005-2013, we show that credit information sharing through public credit registries is negatively associated...

This paper empirically studies how less informed lender wins the position of lead arranger in syndicated loans. We investigate the hypothesis that such lender signals loan quality by restricting deal size to less than that of the most informed lender. Since the less informed lender has smaller...