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dark side, managers' private benefits of control distort firms' takeover incentives and hinder the reallocation role of the … takeover market. On the bright side, fear of a takeover induces underperforming managers to exert more effort and enhances the …How and to what extent do managerial control benefits shape the efficiency of the takeover market? We revisit this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898784
We examine the effects of controlling shareholder stock pledge on corporate acquisition decisions and associated performance. Consistent with our aggravated expropriation hypothesis, we find that pledging firms in China initiate more takeovers, but these acquisitions conducted by pledging firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832661
If a bidder launches a takeover offer for a listed company being part of a stock market index, then index funds and …. This paper analyzes the impact of index fund and ETF ownership on the success of takeover offers in Germany. Based on a … sample of 323 takeover offers of publicly listed German companies between 2006 and 2018, we document a significant negative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012864050
This study analyzed activism that leads to a merger or acquisition (M&A) of a firm to see its benefits for the shareholders at the target firm as well as its acquirer. It used over thirty years of data to understand the impact of the activists’ demands of strategic significance for the firms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034757
We evaluate the effects of management ownership and other corporate governance variables on Hong Kong firms' stock performance following the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98), a period during which corporate governance structures to protect the interests of outside shareholders are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159167
We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906210
, then investors rely less on costly unbiased research. Managers are tempted to manipulate the firm stock price more, as a …, firm owners grant investors more access to managers that manipulate more strongly. An implication is that the firm cost of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826268
This paper studies the first day return of 227 carve-outs during 1996-2013. I find that the first day return of newly issued subsidiary stocks is explained by the reporting distortions in the pre IPO period, conditioned on whether the executives and directors of the subsidiary received stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970504
Higher CEO incentives can both reduce the conflict between management and shareholders, thereby making blockholder monitoring less necessary (“substitution effect”), and increase the ability to punish recalcitrant CEOs through blockholder’s exit, thereby making blockholder monitoring more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403051
Using CEOs’ pilot licenses to proxy for sensation-seeking personality trait, we show that firms with sensation-seeking CEOs increase stock price crash risk. This result holds after addressing endogeneity concerns, using propensity score matching and several difference-in-difference tests. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014353427