In this paper, we characterize the set of pure strategy undominated equilibria in differentiated Bertrand oligopolies with linear demand and constant unit costs when firms may prefer not to produce. When all firms are active, there is a unique equilibrium. However, there is a continuum of...

This paper explores the link between IPO underpricing and financial markets. In my model the IPO is a mean for a capital constrained initial investor to exit and thereby to raise funds for a new investment opportunity. This investor is privately informed vis-a-vis outside investors about the...

We introduce endogenous participation of market makers into a Kyle-type model with long-lived asymmetric information. The main result is that under a plausible parameter setting, the trading volume and price volatility show a U-shape with respect to time, meaning that the market trading...

We devise a tractable model to study the buyer's bid double auction (BBDA) that allows correlated signals and interdependent values/costs. We demonstrate that simple, easily calculated equilibria exist in small markets. We prove that the incentive for strategic behavior vanishes at a O (1/η)...

This paper considers the introduction of stock options in an (dynamically) incomplete securities market made up of a riskless bond and the stock. The stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift. However, there is incomplete information about the unknown stochastic...

We study a market with competition in schedules, such as in asset auctions or wholesale electricity markets, with boundedly rational sellers that partially neglect the informational content of the price. Using the cursed equilibrium concept, we find that the unique symmetric linear equilibrium...

We build a game theoretical model to examine how the level of information advantage of insiders and the competition between insiders and sophisticated investors affect stock price movements and traders' trading strategies and profits. We show that the competition between insiders and...

We numerically determine the equilibrium trading strategies in a Continuous Double Auction (CDA). We consider heterogeneous and liquidity motivated agents, with private values and costs that trade sequentially in random order under time constraints and are not aware of the type of the other...

We model a financial market where some traders of a risky asset do not fully appreciate what prices convey about others' private information. Markets comprising solely such "cursed" traders generate more trade than those comprising solely rationals. Because rationals arbitrage distortions caused...