This paper examines the impact of takeover law enforcement on corporate acquisitions. We use the European Takeover Directive as a natural experiment, which harmonizes takeover law across countries, while leaving its enforcement to the discretion of individual countries. We exploit this...

Permanent or long-term large shareholders have different governance incentives and mechanisms from institutional investors. Liquidity could facilitate either cutting and running by large shareholders or, alternatively, increased monitoring. Using an exogenous shock to liquidity in China, we...

Using instrumental variables, we find that having more antitakeover provisions is not only more likely to prevent a bid but also more likely to cause management resistance in the event of not doing so. The deterrent effect is likely to be decreasing in the cost to rival bidders of acquiring...

We identify a group of investors with a track-record of owning firms that undergo securities class action lawsuits. We hypothesize and find evidence that these investors are ineffective monitors of corporate management. Firms with a large proportion of these shareholders are at greater risk of...

The manner in which hostile takeovers have historically been executed has just begun to receive serious academic attention. Similarly, while the literature on the accuracy and determinants of share prices is voluminous, there has been little systematic historical analysis of when and how modern...

In this paper, we consider the corporate governance challenge of protecting outside investors in listed, controlled firms. European jurisdictions are supposed to be more veteran and skilled in dealing with these firms in comparison to the U.S. But we argue that outside investors in European...

In 2008, share prices on U.S. stock markets fell further than they had during any one year since the 1930s. Does this mean corporate governance “failed?” This paperarticle argues generally “no,” based on a study of a sample of companies at “ground zero” of the stock market meltdown,...

In 2008, share prices on U.S. stock markets fell further than they had during any one year since the 1930s. Does this mean corporate governance “failed”? This paper argues “no”, based on a study of a sample of companies at “ground zero” of the stock market meltdown, namely the 37...